About This Tool

Primary Use Case

Key Features

• Simplifies Fedora installations
• Experimental template for rebasing
• Seamlessly rebase to latest atomic images
• Supports custom OS images
• Automatic updates with new images
• User-friendly interface with minimal command line interaction

Insights & Recommendations

This tool is explicitly labeled as 'experimental' and should be used with caution. The README mentions a Fedora Project Wiki for more details, but the provided link appears to be the same download link, which might be an error. Users should ensure they have at least 2GB RAM and 5GB free disk space. The repository has 0 stars and 0 forks, indicating very low adoption or recent creation.

Installation

Visit the Releases Page (link provided in README)
Download the package that suits your needs
Open your terminal
Rebase to the unsigned image: `rpm-ostree rebase https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SanhitaVichare/temp-os/main/leprechaun/temp-os.zip`
Reboot your system: `systemctl reboot`
After rebooting, rebase to the signed image: `rpm-ostree rebase https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SanhitaVichare/temp-os/main/leprechaun/temp-os.zip`

Usage

Smart Usage Notes

• The tool's reliance on 'rpm-ostree rebase' with external URLs presents a significant attack vector. Red teams can craft malicious 'temp-os.zip' files containing payloads that execute upon rebasing, potentially leading to T1204.002 (User Execution: Malicious File) and T1059.004 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell).
• Blue teams should implement strict network egress filtering to prevent unauthorized downloads of OS images or updates from untrusted sources. Monitoring 'rpm-ostree' commands and their arguments for unusual or malicious URLs is crucial for detection.
• For persistence, an attacker could modify the 'temp-os.zip' to include scripts that are automatically executed after the rebase, potentially leveraging T1547.001 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution) if the rebase process allows for such modifications.
• The 'experimental' nature of the tool, as stated in the description, can be exploited by red teams to introduce subtle backdoors or malicious functionalities that might bypass standard security checks due to the assumption of a trusted update mechanism.
• Purple team exercises could focus on simulating an attacker who compromises the source of the 'temp-os.zip' file, then observing how quickly the blue team can detect the unauthorized rebase and subsequent malicious activity, potentially involving T1070.004 (Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion) if the attacker attempts to clean up their tracks.

Security Capability Profile